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The European Commission is working on a revision of its Guidelines on Research and Devel-
opment Agreements. On this occasion, this note surveys the existing experimental evidence. Ex-
periments add a number of additional arguments to the normative assessment. R&D agreements 
have a much smaller effect on later competition in the product market if they serve as a substitute 
for incomplete (legal) protection of innovation effort. They may help firms settle the resulting 
fairness issue, and stay away from investment wars. Using the results from 107 published exper-
iments on oligopoly, a meta-study shows that clearing an R&D agreement can be beneficial since 
it removes the additional collusion incentive resulting from fear that, through successful innova-
tion, competitors might gain an advantage. This is the case if the opposite market side has coun-
tervailing power, and the more market conditions are stable. By contrast, the meta-data suggests 
that R&D agreements increase the risk of collusion in the product market if products are substi-
tutes, if capacity cannot immediately be extended, if market participants may communicate, and 
if they are experienced; the latter two conditions are very likely to hold in the field.  
Keywords: antitrust, research and development agreements, block exemption, oligopoly experi-
ments, innovation, meta-study 
JEL: D03, D43, K21, L13, L41, O31, O34 
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I. Introduction 
Legal scholars are pleased if the authorities signal that they find their work useful. This may ap-
pear so obvious that one wonders why an academic might find it worth the while to mention it. 
Yet if this scholar spends his time running experiments, practitioners are not among the regular 
readers of his publications. I therefore was indeed pleased when I recently was invited to present 
my meta-study on oligopoly experiments
2 at GD Comp in Brussels. Interaction was lively. The 
lawyers and economists in the room seemed to like my attempts at using this data for checking 
back the guidelines on the increased risk of tacit collusion as an argument in merger control
3. Yet 
being good policy makers, they asked for an additional, more timely contribution. Currently, the 
horizontal guidelines
4 are under review. This review is triggered by the fact that both the block 
exemption on research and development agreements
5 and on specialisation agreements
6 have 
sunset clauses and expire at the end of 2010. Could my data help the Commission make the right 
choices they asked before we parted company.  
This note is my attempt to oblige. My contribution is a modest one. Actually it is more modest 
than my unsolicited contributions to a future revision of the merger guidelines. In the merger 
context, all my contributions concern the risk of the (tacit or explicit) coordination of market 
behaviour. One should therefore have thought that it would not be more difficult to make a con-
tribution to the application of Art. 101 EC. In the merger context, what experimentalists have 
tested, i.e. collusion, matters only indirectly. A merger may be blocked since it substantially in-
creases the risk of (tacit) collusion. By contrast, Art. 101 EC directly intervenes into collusive 
market behaviour. Yet essentially the horizontal guidelines are not about the conditions under 
which collusion is most likely (which is what the experimenters have been interested in). Rather 
the guidelines address the tradeoff between potential social benefit from cooperation (e.g. since it 
makes product or process innovation more likely) and the ensuing cost and risk in terms of re-
duced competitive pressure. This is of course not to say that exploring this conflict from a behav-
ioural angle would be pointless. Quite the contrary. One might for instance design experiments 
to test the power of the excuse. Are participants less inclined to regret harm they impose on the 
opposite market side, and are they less inclined to respect the law, if they may tell themselves: 
but what I am doing is in society’s best interest! One might also want to study the difference be-
tween a per se rule and a rule of reason when it comes to compliance. Are experimental partici-
pants less prepared to play by the rules if the rule in question is not a bright line rule? Yet this 
has not been done.  
This note confines itself to reporting the existing experimental literature in the practically most 
important, and comparatively best studied area, research and development cooperation and com-
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petition. Section II surveys the existing experimental literature on research and development co-
operation. In Section III, I revert to my meta-study for addressing in more rigorous terms the 
only question on which I have sufficient data for quantitative argument: does collusion in exper-
imental markets become less pronounced if cost may be reduced, be that through an exogenous 
shock (think of a change in the price of a raw material) or through the fact that one market partic-
ipant successfully innovates? 
II. Survey 
The existing block exemption expresses its rationale the following way: 
„Cooperation in research and development and in the exploitation of the results gene-
rally promotes technical and economic progress by increasing the dissemination of 
know-how between the parties and avoiding duplication of research and development 
work, by stimulating new advances through the exchange of complementary know-
how, and by rationalising the manufacture of the products or application of the pro-
cesses arising out of the research and development“.
7 
The existing experimental evidence contributes to understanding the motives of market players 
who decide to do cooperative research. In order to maintain control, experiments stylize facts. In 
the experiments reported in this note, this is done by introducing a first stage into a market ex-
periment. In this stage, participants may invest. If they do, this yields a deterministic cost reduc-
tion. Typically, in the experiment nothing is actually produced; just the cost of actions at the 
market stage changes. In the experiments the only purpose of cooperation in “innovation” can be 
a reduction of competitive pressure at the market stage, through harmonizing production cost. 
This design not only limits the external validity of these experiments. It also deprives experi-
menters of an interesting behavioural variable. On the one hand, the willingness to later collude 
might be more limited with true production, since actors hold a mental model of “coopetition”:
8 
they cooperate in research, and they compete in production and marketing. On the other hand, 
the fact that they have been in the same boat during the development of the product might make 
them unwilling to hurt their former cooperation partner when they go on the market. 
The experiments directly only speak to the reverse side of the medal. The R&D agreement 
should not lead to a “disguised cartel”.
9 Yet in antitrust practice, the risk of tacit collusion is not 
the only consideration. For the Commission, the key question is this: 
“Many horizontal cooperation agreements, however, do not have as their object a re-
striction of competition. Therefore, an analysis of the effects of the agreement is nec-
essary. For this analysis it is not sufficient that the agreement limits competition be-
tween the parties. It must also be likely to affect competition in the market to such an 
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extent that negative market effects as to prices, output, innovation or the variety or 
quality of goods and services can be expected“.
10 
It is in the application of these criteria that experimental evidence can be of some help. A single 
paper addresses the full question.
11 In the treatment, it gives participants in a duopoly market a 
chance to agree on the level of cost-reducing investments. Contracts are binding and symmetric. 
In the baseline, investment decisions must be taken independently. At the market stage, partici-
pants compete in price. Explicit collusion is excluded. Participants interact over 35 periods in 
fixed groups. Every 5 periods, they can invest. There are two conditions. In one condition, the 
investment only benefits the participants who have made it. In the alternative condition, the other 
participants can fully appropriate the benefit. This condition is meant to capture the absence of 
patent protection.  
In the experiment, there is much more investment with contracting if the non-investing player 
can appropriate the result. In this situation, prices in the market are not affected. By contrast, if 
investment effort is proprietary, prices are significantly and substantially higher if the players 
have fixed the investment level by contract. This result indicates that the effect on competition in 
the product market hinges on the way firms construct the R&D agreement. The more the agree-
ment seems to solve a problem that is not directly related to competitive pressure, the less it is 
likely to serve as a device for enhancing tacit collusion. This provides tentative backing to the 
concept of coopetition.  
Three more experiments do not give participants a chance to explicitly agree on investment. If 
there is coordination of investment, it has to be tacit. The experiments measure both investment 
and later market activity.
12 The earliest contribution to this literature found no sign of investment 
coordination. Participants would have maximised their payoffs if they had taken turns in reduc-
ing production cost. Then, each of them could have reaped monopoly profits for a number of 
periods. Yet investment was roughly symmetric. At the market stage, there was least collusion 
when the effect of investments depended on chance and when the investor had to share the cost 
advantage with the remaining providers after a limited number of periods. There still was rela-
tively little collusion when the effect of investments was certain, while the investor had to share 
the advantage with others after a while. Market outcomes most pronouncedly differed from the 
competitive benchmark if the success of investment was uncertain, the property right was per-
manent, and when information about investment was private knowledge. Note that the experi-
ment used a double oral auction for determining prices, which is generally known to push prices 
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very close to the competitive benchmark.
13 Hence the fact that there is nonetheless quite some 
collusion indicates that a setting where participants first invest does indeed make later collusion 
in the market more likely. 
Another experiment manipulated the number of suppliers (2 vs. 4) and the strategic variable 
(price vs. quantity).
14 While investment was close to the equilibrium prediction when firms com-
peted in quantity,
15 there was considerable overinvestment when firms competed in price.
16 The 
authors discuss competing behavioural explanations, none of which they find fully convincing. A 
plausible explanation
17 stems from the profit function. When players competed in price, it was 
such that the only way to make a positive profit was outperforming the investment of the other 
player(s).
18 Since participants dreaded this outcome, they became supercompetitive.
19 This ex-
planation would be in line with prospect theory.
20 When individuals perceive an outcome as a 
loss, compared with their individual reference point,
21 they become willing to take fairly high 
risks to prevent the loss from materialising. The authors do not report market outcomes in isola-
tion. Total net profit (after subtracting the investment cost) on average was highly negative when 
players competed in price. The paper demonstrates two things: at least in the tested setting, tacit 
collusion at the investment stage was not an issue. R&D agreements may improve welfare in that 
they prevent firms from engaging in investment wars. The effect seems to be most relevant if 
investment laggards expect zero or negative profits.  
This explanation finds further support in another experiment from two of the authors of the pre-
vious paper.
22 In this game, two firms interact for 20 announced periods in a market where equi-
librium profits are positive.
23 Both may invest to reduce cost. The authors find substantial under-
investment. Underinvestment is even more pronounced if products are only imperfect 
substitutes.
24 Nonetheless, in both cases market behaviour converges toward the equilibrium. 
This is remarkable. For in this experiment, for the market stage demand is represented by the 
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computer, playing the demand curve. Consequently, demand is passive. In general, this is the 
environment where collusion is highest.
25 
A further experiment is less relevant for the Guidelines since it only studies investment behav-
iour (with market outcome and hence payoffs determined by the computer).
26 The author shows 
that, in a duopoly with perfect property rights in innovation, investment is very close to the equi-
librium, even if participants have a chance to chat. Only if binding contracts are available there is 
underinvestment, the more so the longer participants interact. By contrast, if the competitor may 
immediately appropriate the innovation effort, there is less underinvestment than theory predicts. 
With pure communication (“cheap talk”) participants even invest slightly more than the social 
optimum, while binding contracts are mildly effective. This result suggests that participants see 
appropriable investment as a fairness issue. They want a chance to appeal to their competitor’s 
sense of fairness before they make themselves vulnerable to exploitation. This points to an addi-
tional motive for exempting concerted investment behaviour from Art. 101 EC. This motive is 
conditional on the quality of the intellectual property rights a firm may unilaterally acquire. A 
practical illustration would be patent pools, to the extent that they react to the fact that each firm 
depends on property rights held by its competitors. Even if its own new invention is protected, 
this gives other firms sufficient threat power to invalidate the temporary monopoly. 
A final set of experiments explores R&D competition, again without testing its effects on prod-
uct market competition. A first experiment replicates the fact that participants overinvest if they 
compete in price.
27 The effect is even stronger in markets of 4 than in markets of 2. By contrast, 
when they compete in quantity, there is underinvestment in markets of 4, and only slight overin-
vestment in markets of 2. Overinvestment is also observed in an experiment where one of the 
players has an initial cost advantage.
28 These players overinvest heavily to maintain their domi-
nant position. Consequently, in this case asymmetry increases the policy problem, and might 
provide an additional justification for granting an exemption from Art. 101 EC. Two more exper-
iments explore the social damage resulting from a patent race.
29 This is more remote in that the 
winner gains a monopoly, and therefore has no longer a need to coordinate market behaviour. 
Moreover, since only one firm can have the patent, this induces a pattern of hit and run competi-
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481 – 502 (2009). 
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ploring Innovation Behavior, 60 Metroeconomica 724 – 752 (2009); also see Crosetto, To Patent or not to 
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tion.
30 These papers show that, also from an experimental viewpoint, a patent race may reduce wel-
fare. To prevent this from happening may justify exempting R&D cooperation from Art. 101 EC. 
III. Meta-Study 
Compared with the standard of the experimental literature, the previous section had to be uncom-
fortably imprecise. It could only argue qualitatively, although a major advantage of experimental 
rigour is assessing the absolute and relative magnitude of effects. Of course, the papers reported 
do so lege artis. But for the purpose of redesigning the horizontal guidelines, one would have to 
know more about the robustness of the results once the specific parameters of the respective ex-
periment are changed. In principle, this is a job for meta-analysis. Yet the reported papers are too 
diverse, and their number is too small, to make meta-analysis meaningful. In conclusion of this 
note, I therefore revert to my meta-study of all oligopoly experiments until 2006. Actually, the 
period of observation is not a limitation. For the papers that are covered by the previous section, 
but not by the meta-analysis, unfortunately do not report data on the market stage in such a way 
that I could add these data-points to the meta-analysis.
31  
The contribution I can make has, however, limited scope. I can only make statements regarding 
the repercussions on the product market. The independent variable of interest is the possibility 
for asymmetric shocks regarding production cost.
32 Asymmetric means that potentially only 
some suppliers benefit from the cost reduction. In my dataset, these shocks may, but need not, 
result from purposeful innovation. I have also added two experiments where single firms can 
benefit from exogenous cost reductions,
33 and another where two previously independent firms 
can reduce cost after their merger, through synergies.
34  
I have two dependent variables: the proportional deviation of the market outcome, regarding the 
strategic variable (price or quantity), from the outcome if competition is perfect; and the propor-
tional deviation from the equilibrium.
35 Both indices are normalised on the interval [0,100]. 0 
means no collusion at all. 100 means the outcome that maximises joint profit of suppliers. From 
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a normative perspective, the former index is of greater interest. For it is directly related to the 
welfare loss. The latter index informs the Commission to which degree it may expect a problem 
(or a solution) if it intervenes, or if it abstains from intervention. 
Although this is only partial evidence, it may help the Commission revise the list of criteria it has 
laid down for assessing R&D agreements: 
“The nature of an agreement relates to factors such as the area and objective of the 
cooperation, the competitive relationship between the parties and the extent to which 
they combine their activities. These factors indicate the likelihood of the parties 
coordinating their behaviour in the market“.
36  
“Depending on the market position of the parties and the concentration in the market, 
other factors such as the stability of market shares over time, entry barriers and the 
likelihood of market entry, the countervailing power of buyers/suppliers or the nature 
of the products (e.g. homogeneity, maturity) have to be considered as well“.
37 
Statistically speaking, to this end, the main effect of “innovation”, i.e. the possibility of a cost 
reduction for some suppliers, is only of limited interest. The interaction effect is more important: 
Does the respective feature of the market have a different effect when there is also room for 
asymmetric cost shocks? To explain the methodology, take model 2 in table 1. In this model, the 
main effect of innovation is positive, indicating that, everything else held constant, collusion in-
creases by 28% if participants may invest into cost reductions. Yet through the interaction effect, 
the risk of tacit collusion decreases by 52% if the innovation option is introduced into a market 
where products are substitutes. The net effect is 28% – 52% = -24%. Hence while the innovation 
option increases the risk of collusion when products are homogeneous, it decreases collusion if 
products are heterogeneous. 
If the interaction effect is positive, clearing an R&D agreement might pay a double dividend, 
since it also reduces the threat that competitors gain an advantage through reducing their cost. If 
the agreement removes this threat, it also removes the additional motive for collusion. Yet 
whether this holds also depends on the sign and the size of the main effect. Consequently, if the 
interaction effect is positive, ultimately the measure of interest is the net effect, i.e. the main + 
the interaction effect. If the interaction effect is negative, clearing the agreement would remove 
this normatively desirable effect. This holds irrespective of the sign and the size of the main ef-
fect. Of course, if the net effect remains positive, there is still a normative problem. But it at least 
is smaller if the R&D agreement is not allowed to become effective. 
Since space is restricted, I only report significant interaction effects.
38 If I take deviations from 
the efficient price or quantity to be the norm, I do indeed find a number of negative interaction 
effects, indicating that allowing the agreement to go through would increase the risk of collusion 
since it removes the threat of a cost advantage for the competitor. This holds if products are sub-
                                        
36   Guidelines, 21. 
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38   Since otherwise marginal effects could no longer be directly read off the coefficients (and to preempt prob-
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stitutes, if market participants can communicate, and if they are experienced. In model 3 I also 
find a negative interaction effect if one firm is a (Stackelberg) leader, and the larger the number 
of suppliers in the market.
39 Yet these effects swap sign if I control for the remaining explanatory 
variables in model 9.
40 By contrast, in the complete model I also find a negative interaction ef-
fect if the strategic variable is quantity.
41 In the field, this is a plausible assumption when capaci-
ty cannot easily be extended in the short run.
42 
Whenever the interaction effect is positive, I also find a positive net effect. Hence I only have 
cases where clearing the R&D agreement promises a double dividend. This is true if the opposite 
market side is active,
43 and the more market conditions are stable.
44 In the complete model, I also 
find positive net effects for sequential interaction, and for an increase in the number of competi-
tors. 
As the considerably smaller R
2 shows, the available independent variables generally explain de-
viations from the competitive equilibrium
45 less well.
46 For two variables that matter for explain-
ing the degree of inefficiency I do not find a significant interaction effect: the number of compet-
itors, and stability. The interaction term between innovation and the product being a substitute is 
significant only in the complex models 4 and 9. By contrast, for the interaction with a first mover 
advantage and with competition in quantity, simpler models suffice than with the alternative de-
pendent variable.  
If the Commission is concerned about deviations from the equilibrium, clearing an R&D agree-
ment is problematic if firms compete in quantity. This was also true with the alternative depend-
ent variable, indicating that this is a robust situation where the risk of a competitor reducing cost 
fosters competition. Yet for all other independent variables, the interaction effect with innovation 
and net effects have opposite sign, compared with the regressions explaining deviations from the 
efficient market outcome. The fact that the opposite market side is active now implies stiffer 
competition when cost may be unilaterally reduced. Surprisingly, the same also holds if suppliers 
may post prices.
47 This implies that customers may only refuse to deal, but have no chance to 
negotiate, as customarily in a department store. Since this protocol makes buyers relatively inac-
                                        
39   In the experiment: if suppliers interact sequentially, such that one moves before the other. 
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42   For the underlying theory see Kreps/Scheinkman, Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yields 
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45   Technically speaking: the Nash equilibrium. 
46   The smaller number of observations results from the fact that the Nash equilibrium cannot always be calcu-
lated since some papers have not reported sufficient detail. 
47   The interaction with this variable is insignificant with the alternative dependent variable, which is why it 
does not show up in table 2.   10
tive, one might have expected a positive coefficient.
48 By contrast, the fact that products are sub-
stitutes, that one firm is a Stackelberg leader, and that firms may communicate implies larger 
deviations from the equilibrium if competitor’s cost may fall. Since in all these cases, also the 
net effect is positive, clearing an R&D agreement promises a double dividend (if considered 
from the angle of the equilibrium). Interestingly, the net effect is also positive if experimenters 
have given suppliers a chance to conclude binding agreements. This can be read as direct exper-
imental evidence in favour of granting the block exemption.  
IV. Conclusion 
A well designed experiment may prove causality. With field data, this is much more difficult. 
Yet the major methodological advantage of experiments is also the source of the biggest limita-
tion. In the interest of isolating causes, experiments severely stylize facts. From a policy perspec-
tive, experiments therefore hardly ever settle the case. Yet they are a useful supplement to theo-
ry, field evidence, comparative law, and case law. This note shows to which degree this 
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ry variables, innovation, and all interaction terms. Both interaction terms of interest are significant, and both 
are negative. Even the interaction term between human buyers and the posted offer institution is negative (al-





  model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5  model 6  model 7  model 8  model 9 
innovation  27.833* 27.291*  18.107***  26.240*  28.683* 21.607  -13.153 35.595* 6.386 
substitute   37.551***  40.558***       39.310***  34.265*** 
innXsubst   -52.046***  -37.969***         
inn+innXsubst  -24.755  -19.862         
sequential     3.578        4.236 
innXseq     -21.390*        22.889* 
inn+innXseq     -3.283        27.125 
strategic_variable    -21.875***        -16.228*** 
innXstrat     -20.33        -68.182*** 
inn+innXstrat             -84.41 
substXseq     10.388         
substXstrat     27.230***         
seqXstrat     -15.724**         
human_buyer      -34.135***     -17.328*** 
innXhum       28.551*      34.065*** 
inn+innXhum       54.791      16.737 
agreement         22.495**     -13.225 
innXagr         138.042**     
inn+innXagr         166.725      
communication        -11.234     18.548* 
innXcomm         -42.908**     
inn+innXcomm        -14.225      
experience          -10.739**   -4.726 
innXexp         -38.841**    
inn+innXexp          -17.234     
marketsize           -5.787***  3.712*** 
innXma           -32.705*   13.080*** 
inn+innXma           -45.858   16.792 
rounds            -0.357***  -0.277*** 
innXrounds            0.962**  -0.291 
inn+innXrounds           0.605 -0.291 
substXrounds           0.117  -0.333 
innXsubstXrounds           4.378***  3.139*** 
n e t 3             40.935  2.571 
Constant  34.936***  36.578*** 35.453*** 36.950*** 36.382*** 35.974*** 57.016*** 28.053***  36.358*** 
Observations  479 479  465  479  479 479 479 479 465 
R-squared  0.024 0.157  0.286  0.135  0.059 0.033 0.134 0.186 0.392 
***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1           
 
Table 1: Proportional Deviation from the Market Clearing Price or Quantity 
variables: innovation (0 1): participants may invest into cost reductions 
substitute (0 1): products are heterogeneous 
sequential (0 1): (at least) one participant knows other participants’ choices before she moves 
strategic variable (0 1): 0 = price, 1 = quantity 
human buyer (0 1): opposite market side is represented by experimental subjects 
agreement (0 1): participants have the option to explicitly coordinate market behaviour 
communication (0 1): at least one participant may send a message to the other participants before they move 
experience (0 1): participants have played similar games before 
marketsize (2 25): number of experimental suppliers 
rounds (1 100): number of repetitions 
X indicates interaction effects 









  model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5  model 6  model 7  model 8  model 9 
innovation -2.989  -20.082  -13.178  -26.302  2.508 -52.317***  -3.7  -8.486  -59.841*** 
substitute       -2.163      0.693  1.975  -12.557 
innXsubst       122.374*      35.948 45.521 91.680* 
inn+innXsubst    96.072         31.839 
sequential   -16.321    -20.080*         -13.723 
innXseq   86.205**   139.508*          161.008*** 
inn+innXseq   66.123   113.206         101.167 
substXseq       -149.639***          
strategic_variable   0.409  -1.85          11.866 
innXstrat     -110.017**  -187.068**         -139.161** 
inn+innXstrat     -123.195  -213.37          -199.002 
substXstrat       -13.178           
seqXstrat       -30.516**           
posted         28.728*       61.544*** 
innXposted         -59.625*       
inn+innXposted       -57.117        
human_buyer         -21.806***      4.565 
innXhum           -387.102***   -341.790*** 
inn+innXhum           -439.419      -401.631 
agreement            27.525***   49.336* 
innXagr            55.483*     
inn+innXagr             51.783    
substXagr            30.276**     
communication            23.608***  -5.553 
innXcomm              69.634*   
inn+innXcomm            61.148  
substXcomm              34.704***   
Constant  -2.053  -2.965  -1.607  -3.597 -4.131  -4.802 -2.657  -2.846  -6.262 
Observations  404  404  392  392 404  404 404  404  392 
R-squared 0  0.017 0.015  0.094  0.024 0.06  0.015  0.02  0.141 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1               
 
Table 2: Proportional Deviation from the Equilibrium Price or Quantity 
 
 
 